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Abstract
This paper studies the agency problem between a firm and its research employees in a dy-
namic optimal contracting setting. We implement the optimal contract by a risky security,
which can be created using the equity of the firm, and a sequence of performance-based hold-
ing requirements. This result provides a rationale for using performance-vested equity-based
compensation in R&D-intensive start-up firms.
Key words: Performance-vesting Provisions, Dynamic Contract, R&D
JEL: D23, D82, D86, J33, L22, O32
∗I sincerely thank the editor, B. Ravikumar, and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and
suggestions. I would like to thank Srihari Govindan, Ayca Kaya, Kyungmin Kim, Mandar Oak, Raymond Riezman,
Yuzhe Zhang, and seminar participants at The University of Iowa, the University of Adelaide, 2017 Asia Meeting of
the Econometric Society in Hong Kong, 2017 China Meeting of the Econometric Society in Wuhan, and 2018 China
Meeting of the Econometric Society in Shanghai for their valuable advice and comments. Any errors are my own.
†School of Economics, The University of Adelaide, Email: yaping.shan@adelaide.edu.au
1 Introduction1
In high-tech start-up firms, equity-based compensations have become an important compen-2
sation scheme for research employees. Twitter, one of the most successful start-up firms in the3
last decade, went public in 2013. During the same year, it spent $380 million in equity-based4
compensation for its research employees, which accounted for 64% of its total R&D expenses.15
Equity-based compensation helps to provide incentives to research employees by providing a direct6
link between the employees’ compensation and the firm’s performance and is particularly attrac-7
tive for cash‐constrained firms. Regarding provision, equity-based compensations vest over time.8
Over the last two decades, a general trend observed in equity-based compensation practice is the9
shifting from traditional simple time-vesting provisions to performance-vesting provisions.2 Per-10
formance‐vesting, contrary to time‐vesting, helps with incentive provision when the firm’s growth11
depends crucially on the stochastic outcomes of its R&D projects, and hence is particularly useful12
in R&D-intensive start-up firms.13
This paper provides an example of an environment in which, under some conditions, perfor-14
mance‐vested equity‐based compensation arises as an optimal outcome. We use an optimal con-15
tracting approach to analyze the agency problem between a firm and its research employees. A16
major methodological contribution of this paper is the tractability of the contracting problem which17
has a closed-form solution. The key question is what kind of compensation scheme could implement18
the optimal contract, and how it is related to the performance‐vested equity-based compensation19
observed in practice. Our findings indicate that the optimal contract can be implemented by using20
a risky security with a sequence of holding requirements that will be relaxed once a performance21
target is achieved. Sharing the main features with performance-vested equity-based compensations,22
these results provide a motive for using performance-vested equity-based compensation in start-up23
1This calculation is based on Twitter’s Form 10-k for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013. “Research and
development expenses consist primarily of personnel-related costs, including salaries, benefits and stock-based com-
pensation, for engineers and other employees engaged in the research and development of products and services”
(Twitter Form 10-k 2013).
2In a report by Salary.com, a leading consumer and enterprise resource for compensation data, Whittlesey (2007)
stated that the most notable change in equity-based compensation provisions for both executive grants and all-
employee programs is “the widespread introduction of performance-based plans with a wide variety of features.”
Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpathy (2018) documented that “the usage of performance-vesting equity awards to top
executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012.”
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firms that rely on R&D from the theoretical point of view.24
We set up the contracting problem using the model studied in Shan (2017). Briefly, a risk-25
neutral principal hires a risk-averse agent to perform a multi-stage R&D project. The multi-stage26
feature captures the observation that the performance of research employees is usually linked to the27
completion of a sequence of milestones rather than their day-to-day practice. At any point in time,28
the agent can choose whether to put in effort or shirk. Subject to the agent investing effort, the29
transition from one stage to the next is a Poisson process with a constant arrival rate. The progress30
of the innovation process is publicly observable, and the principal cannot monitor the agent’s31
action, which causes a dynamic moral-hazard problem. Shan (2017) characterized the optimal32
contract under the assumption that the principal has full control over the agent’s consumption.33
In the optimal contract, using a “carrot and stick” strategy, the principal punishes the agent by34
lowering his compensation over time in case of failure and rewards him by a discrete increase in the35
payment after each success.36
Using this model, the current paper provides an implementation of the optimal contract and37
discusses how it connects to existing compensation practice. We show that the optimal contract can38
be implemented by a state-contingent security that appreciates in case of success but depreciates39
in case of failure. At any point in time, besides the effort choice, the agent also chooses how40
much to consume and how much to invest in the security for savings subject to a sequence of41
holding requirements on the risky security. Different from the optimal contract, in which the42
principal controls the agent’s consumption directly, the agent chooses the consumption process in43
this implementation, which nonetheless generates the same effort and consumption process as the44
optimal contract. The key finding of the implementation results is how the design of the holding45
requirement depends on the agent’s performance. In the implementation, the principal requires the46
agent to meet a minimum holding requirement on the state-contingent security till the completion47
of the project and gradually relaxes the holding requirement as the project progresses. Our model48
shows that the principal uses the state-contingent security to compensate the agent to encourage49
him to bear some risks in return for incentives, and the holding requirement in the implementation50
guarantees the minimum amount of risks that the agent has to take for incentives. When the R&D51
project progresses, the uncertainty of the project reduces, and hence the holding requirement can52
be relaxed.53
In general, the payoff structure of the state-contingent security that implements the optimal54
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contract depends on the utility function of the agent. There may not exist a financial asset that55
has the exact payoff of the security. However, the firm can use its equity and other available56
financial assets to approximate the payoff of the security and use the performance-vesting provision57
to mimic the performance-based minimum holding requirements. We also consider an example in58
which, under some conditions, the state-contingent security can be directly linked to the firm’s59
equity. Assuming that the agent has a logarithmic utility function, the contracting model has a60
closed-form solution. In this case, the state-contingent security has the property that its value61
increases proportionally after each success, and hence it can be created by a portfolio of the firm’s62
equity and a risk-free asset if the firm’s value also grows proportionally after each breakthrough of63
its R&D project. In this example, the implementation becomes surprisingly simple. The principal64
only needs to adjust the fraction of equity in the compensation portfolio when the project progresses65
to the next stage and can leave all other decision problems to the agent. The proportionate growth66
assumption on the evolution of firm’s value is a key assumption to derive these results. In practice,67
most R&D-intensive start-up firms are backed by venture capital, and whether a firm can receive68
further rounds of financing depends crucially on the development of its main research project.69
We show that this proportionate growth assumption is consistent with the growth pattern of firm70
valuation at each financing round for firms that are backed by venture capital.371
Theoretically, the optimality of equity-based implementation requires that the firm’s value de-72
pends only on the progress of the R&D project and that the firm has an accurate prediction about73
how its value is affected by the project. In practice, however, the firm’s value is also affected by74
other factors, for example, market aggregate risks, or the performance of other R&D teams when75
several projects are performed simultaneously. In these cases, equity-based incentive compensa-76
tion exposes the agent to risks that are not related to his action and becomes less efficient. For77
these situations, we provide an alternative implementation of the optimal contract using a savings78
account plus performance-based bonuses after each success. In this implementation, the principal79
offers the agent a savings account with an initial balance. At any point in time, the agent can80
withdraw money from the savings account for consumption. The principal rewards the agent with81
a performance bonus and deposits it into the savings account after each success. Similar to the82
equity-based implementation, this implementation also generates the same effort and consumption83
3The proportionate growth property is also called Gibrat’s law which states that the proportional rate of growth
of a firm is independent of its absolute size.
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process as the optimal contract. Comparing these two implementations, the advantage of equity-84
based implementation is its simplicity for which the principal only needs to adjust the composition85
of the compensation portfolio according to the progress of the project. It is attractive to cash-86
constrained start-up firms because it allows them to spend cash in other important areas. However,87
it may expose the agent to the risks that are not related to his action. If the principal is able to use88
cash bonuses, the alternative implementation prevents the agent from bearing unnecessary risks,89
but it requires the principal to monitor the balance of the savings account because the agent is90
risk-averse and hence the size of bonus depends on the balance of the savings account.91
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related literature.92
Section 3 describes the benchmark model and the optimal contract. In Section 4, we present an93
implementation of the optimal dynamic contract and discuss how it relates to performance-vested94
equity-based compensation. Section 5 considers an example in which the agent has a logarith-95
mic utility function. We provide an alternative implementation via performance-based bonuses in96
Section 6. Section 7 presents the conclusions. Some extensions of the paper are discussed in the97
Appendix.98
2 Literature Review99
The CEO compensation literature provides extensive research on equity-based grants. Edmans,100
Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012) studied the optimal CEO compensation in a dynamic frame-101
work and provided an implementation of the optimal contract using a “Dynamic Incentive Account”102
that comprises cash and the firm’s equity. The main difference between their model and our model103
is the approach to model how the agent’s action affects his performance. Since CEO’s effort often104
has an important impact on the operation of the firm, in Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov105
(2012), the earnings of the firm in each period are determined by the CEO’s effort and a random106
noise. In continuous-time settings, this agency problem is usually modeled by the Brownian-motion107
process in which the agent’s unobserved effort controls the drift (for example He (2009)). For re-108
search employees’ incentive problem, since the effort invested in research today will not necessarily109
lead to a discovery tomorrow, we assume that the agent’s effort affects the probability of success110
and model the innovation process as a Poisson-type process. In both papers, the equity-based111
compensation features vesting which ensures that the agent has sufficient equity in the future to112
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induce effort, and the equity compensation fully vests at the time after which the agent’s action113
cannot affect the firm’s value anymore (when the agent retires in Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and114
Sannikov (2012) and when the agent completes the whole project in our model). The difference115
in assumptions about how the agent’s unobservable actions affect the firm’s value also leads to116
different features in implementation regarding vesting. In Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov117
(2012), the vesting of equity-based compensation is time-based because the agent’s action affects118
the drift of the firm’s value. In our model, the agent’s action controls the arrival of a series of119
innovations, and hence the vesting is performance-based.120
With regard to researchers’ compensation, Anderson, Banker, and Ravindran (2000), Ittner,121
Lambert, and Larcker (2003), and Murphy (2003) have documented that executives and employ-122
ees in research intensive firms receive more equity-based compensation than their counterparts in123
traditional industries. Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi, and Kruse (2002) compared the performance of 229124
research intensive firms offering broad-based stock options with that of their non-stock option coun-125
terparts. They showed that the former have higher shareholder returns. For performance-vesting126
provisions, Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpathy (2010), found that “performance-vesting provisions127
specify meaningful performance hurdles and provide significant incentives.” Also, “performance-128
vesting firms had significantly better subsequent operating performance than control firms.” Our129
paper contributes to this literature by establishing a specific role for performance-vesting provisions130
in the optimal contracting problem.131
In terms of methodology, this article follows the rich and growing literature on continuous-time132
dynamic contracting. Sannikov (2008) analyzed a continuous-time principal-agent model, in which133
the output is a Brownian-motion process with drift determined by the agent’s unobserved effort.134
A similar Brownian motion framework is often used to model agency problems in fields such as135
CEO compensation and corporate finance (DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006); He (2009); He (2011)).136
Recently, a few scholars have studied the dynamic moral hazard problem using a Poisson process,137
where the agent exerts unobservable effort that controls the arrival rate. In Biais, Mariotti, Rochet,138
and Villeneuve (2010) and Myerson (2015), bad events happen with higher Poisson arrival rate when139
agents do not put enough effort to prevent such events. In Sun and Tian (2017), the principal needs140
to provide the incentive for the agent to exert effort to raise the arrival rate of a Poisson process.141
Most of these studies have assumed that the agent is risk neutral. The risk-neutrality assumption142
implies that the agent does not receive any payment until the continuation utility reaches a payment143
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threshold (Biais, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2010); Myerson (2015)), or only receives bonuses144
upon arrivals (Sun and Tian (2017)). Shan (2017) studied a similar contracting problem in which the145
principal faces multiple risk-averse agents. With a risk-averse agent, besides providing the incentive146
to work, the optimal contract also needs to account for consumption smoothing. Therefore, the147
agent’s payment is contingent on the entire history and varies over time. In Shan (2017), the148
optimal contract is written in terms of the agent’s continuation utility, which is an abstract term.149
Also, the agent’s consumption is controlled by the principal, which is not realistic. Based on the150
theoretical model of Shan (2017), the current paper provides an implementation of the optimal151
contract in which the agent makes both effort and consumption decisions. The implementation152
uses the standard instruments that are available in practice and provides a justification for using153
performance-vested equity-based compensation.154
The implementation of the optimal contract overcomes the problem pointed out by Rogerson155
(1985) which is that, if the agent is allowed access to credit, he will adopt a joint deviation of156
shirking and saving some of his wages, because of a wedge between the agent’s Euler equation and157
the inverse Euler equation implied by the principal’s problem. In our implementation, however,158
the return on savings is state contingent. When the state-contingent rates of return are chosen159
appropriately, the agent’s Euler equation mimics the inverse Euler equation; put differently, the160
wedge between the Euler equation and the inverse Euler equation disappears. A similar problem161
arises in the dynamic optimal taxation problem studied by Kocherlakota (2005), in which the agents162
in the economy are privately informed about their skills. In Kocherlakota (2005), to prevent joint163
deviations, the return on savings is made to be stochastic by tailoring the tax rates on saving to the164
agent’s announcements of his private information, and hence the government needs to keep track of165
the entire history of the agent’s announcements to set the tax rates. In our model, the problem is166
much more tractable, especially for the logarithmic utility case in which the principal only needs to167
know the current stage level of the project because the holding requirement only varies with stage168
level.169
3 The benchmark model170
The benchmark model is similar to the single-agent model studied in Shan (2017), in which the171
principal has full control over the agent’s consumption. In this model, time is continuous. At time172
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0, a principal hires an agent to perform an R&D project. This project has N stages, which must be173
completed sequentially, i.e., to develop the stage n (0 < n ≤ N) innovation, the agent must have174
completed the innovations of stage n − 1. The transition from one stage to the next is modeled175
by a Poisson process, which is affected by the agent’s choice of effort. For simplicity, the agent is176
assumed to have only two effort choices: he can either put in effort or shirk. If the agent puts in177
effort, the arrival rate of completing an innovation is λ. If the agent chooses to shirk, he fails with178
probability 1, and the Poisson arrival rate is equal to zero.179
The agent’s action cannot be monitored by the principal. However, the principal can observe180
exactly when each stage of the R&D project is completed. Let Ht be the history of the agent’s181
performance up to time t. It records the number of stages completed and the time taken by the agent182
to complete each stage. By assumption, Ht is publicly observable, which is the only information183
that the principal can use to provide incentives to the agent.184
At time 0, the principal offers the agent a contract that specifies a flow of consumption ct(Ht)185
based on the principal’s observation of the agent’s performance. Let T denote the stochastic stop-186
ping time when the agent completes the last-stage innovation. After time T , the principal does187
not need to provide any incentive for the agent to work, and hence the agent receives a constant188
payment over time, which is equivalent to a lump-sum consumption transfer at time T .189
We assume that the agent’s utility function has a separable form U(c) − L(a), where U(c)190
is the utility from consumption, and L(a) is the disutility of exerting effort. We assume that191
U : [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) is an increasing, concave, and C2 function, and satisfies the Inada condition192
limc→+∞ U
′(c) = 0. The agent’s choice of effort is binary, indicated by a ∈ {0, 1}. a = 1 means193
that the agent chooses to put in effort, and a = 0 means that the agent chooses to shirk. Moreover,194
the disutility of putting in effort equals some l > 0, and the disutility of shirking equals zero, i.e.,195
L(1) = l and L(0) = 0.196
Given the contract, at any time t, the agent makes the effort choice based on the observation of197
Ht. The effort process is denoted as a = {at(Ht), 0 ≤ t < ∞}. The agent’s objective is to choose198






re−rt(U(ct)− L(at))dt+ e−rTU(cT )
]
,
where r is the discount rate.4 Moreover, the agent has a reservation-utility v0. If the maximum200
4We normalize the flow term by multiplying it by the discount rate so that the total discounted utility equals the
8
expected utility he can get from the contract is less than v0, then the agent will reject the principal’s201
offer.202
We assume that the agent and the principal have the same discount rate. Hence, the principal’s203








We assume that the completion of R&D is quite valuable to the principal; therefore, he always205
wants to induce the agent to work.5 Hence, the principal’s objective is to minimize the expected cost206
by choosing an incentive-compatible payment scheme subject to delivering the agent the requisite207













re−rt(U(ct)− l)dt+ e−rTU(cT )
]
≥ v0.
Finally, to simplify the analysis, we could recast the problem as one where the principal directly210
transfers utility to the agent instead of consumption. In the transformed problem, the principal211
chooses a stream of utility transfers ut(Ht) (0 ≤ t < +∞) to minimize the expected cost of212













re−rt(ut − l)dt+ e−rTuT
]
≥ v0,
where S(u) = U−1(u), which is the principal’s cost of providing the agent with utility u. It can be215
shown that S(u) is an increasing and strictly convex function and limu→+∞ S′(u) = +∞.216
The contracting problem can be analyzed recursively using the agent’s continuation utility v,217
which is the total utility that the principal expects the agent to derive at a given point in time. At218
any moment in time, given the continuation utility, the contract specifies the agent’s utility flow u,219
utility flow when the flow is constant over time. Thus, the agent’s total discounted utility at time T equals U(cT ).
5By assumption, the project has finite number of stages. Moreover, the arrival rate of success when the agent
exerts effort is fixed. Hence, if the revenue of completing the project is sufficient high, it is always optimal to induce
the agent to work.
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the continuation utility v̄ if he completes an innovation, and the law of motion of the continuation220
utility if he fails.221
The details of the derivation of the recursive form can be found in Shan (2017). Intuitively,222
when the agent exerts effort, he raises the arrival rate of success from 0 to λ. After a success, his223
continuation utility changes from v to v̄. Hence his expected benefits of exerting effort is λ(v̄ − v).224
His costs of exerting effort is rl. To provide incentive to work, the contract should satisfy the225
following incentive-compatibility condition:226
λ(v̄ − v) ≥ rl.
Thus, in any incentive compatible contract, the agent’s continuation utility increases by at least rlλ227
after each success. For the evolution the agent’s continuation utility in case of failure, since the228
continuation utility can be explained as the value that the principal owes the agent, when the agent229
exerts effort, his continuation utility grows at the discount rate r and falls because of the net flow230
of utility r(u− l) plus the gain of utility v̄− v at rate λ if the agent completes an innovation. Thus,231
his continuation utility in case of failure evolves according to232
dv
dt
= rv − r(u− l)− λ(v̄ − v).
Let Cn(v) be the principal’s minimum cost of delivering continuation utility v when the project233
is at stage n. Next, we characterize the evolution of the principal’s continuation value Cn(v). Since234
the principal discounts the future at rate r, his expected flow of value at a given point in time is235
given by236
rCn(v).
This must equals to sum of the expected instantaneous cash flows rS(u) and the expected rate of237
change in the continuation value. The later equals to the sum of the variation of the principal’s238
costs brought by the change in the agent’s continuation utility and the variation of costs when the239
project progresses to the next stage at rate λ. This yields240




The principal controls u and v̄ to minimize his continuation value. In the recursive form, the241
principal’s problem is to solve the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation242
rCn(v) = min
u,v̄








= rv − r(u− l)− λ(v̄ − v),
λ(v̄ − v) ≥ rl.
As the agent is assumed to have limited liability, the continuation utility cannot be less than244
0, because the agent can guarantee a utility level of 0 by not putting in any effort. Therefore, a245
negative continuation utility is not viable.246
In the HJB equation, to solve cost function Cn, we need to know the functional form of Cn+1.247
Note that after the agent completes the final stage, he receives a lump-sum transfer, which implies248
that CN+1(v) = S(v). Then the whole problem can be solved by backward induction starting from249
the last stage-N problem. Shan (2017) uses a diagrammatic analysis to characterize the solution250
of the HJB equation. The main properties of the optimal contract are summarized in Proposition251
3.1.252
Proposition 3.1 The optimal contract has the following property:253
(i) The principal’s expected cost at any point is given by an increasing, convex and differentiable254
function Cn(v), which satisfies255
rCn(v) = rS(u
∗(v)) + C ′n(v)[r(v − u∗(v))] + λ[Cn+1(v̄)− Cn(v)],




r+λ . The cost function when256
the agent completes the last stage innovation is given by CN+1(v) = S(v).257
(ii) The instantaneous payment u∗(v) satisfies S′(u∗(v)) = C ′n(v).258
(iii) When the agent completes an innovation, he enters the next stage and starts with the con-259
tinuation utility v̄, which satisfies v̄ = v + rlλ .260
(iv) In case of failure, the continuation utility v smoothly decreases over time and stays at 0 when261
it reaches the lower bound 0.262
(v) The minimum-cost functions satisfy Cn(v) > Cn+1(v) and Cn(v) < Cn+1(v+ rlλ ) for all v ≥ 0.263
Its derivative satisfies limv→+∞ C ′n(v) = +∞.264
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Proposition 3.1 indicates that the optimal contract combines rewards and punishments. The265
principal rewards the agent by an upward adjustment in the compensation after each success and266
punishes the agent by cutting his compensation for unsatisfactory performance. Thus, the principal267
induces the risk-averse agent to bear some risks by introducing some uncertainties into his compen-268
sation. Otherwise, the agent lacks an incentive to work. Proposition 3.1 also shows that the costs269
of delivering the same level of continuation utility is higher at an earlier stage of the project (Figure270
1). This is because, at an earlier stage, the uncertainties about the future are higher. Hence, the271











Figure 1: Cost functions.
4 Implementation of the optimal contract273
The optimal contract presented in the benchmark model relies entirely on the continuation util-274
ity, which is an abstract concept. Moreover, in the benchmark model, we make a strong assumption275
that the principal controls the agent’s consumption directly, i.e., the agent consumes all the pay-276
ments from the principal at any point in time. In this section, we present an implementation of the277
optimal contract, which uses monetary terms rather than the abstract continuation utility, and in278
12
which the agent also makes consumption decisions besides choosing the effort. Yet, we show that279
the implementation generates the same consumption path as the original optimal contract. In this280
implementation, a primary component of the agent’s compensation is a state-contingent security281
that appreciates when the project succeeds and depreciates when it fails. The agent is required282
to meet a sequence of minimum holding requirements that is relaxed after each success until the283
whole project is completed. Capturing the main features of performance-vested equity-based com-284
pensation, the implementation results show that the principal can use this compensation scheme285
to mimic the theoretical optimal contract derived with the assumption that the principal has full286
control over the agent’s consumption, thereby providing a rationale for using performance-vested287
equity-based compensation from a theoretical point of view.288
The setup is the same as the benchmark model except that the consumption is decided by the289
agent rather than controlled by the principal. To implement the optimal contract, the principal290
designs a state-contingent security, whose return is higher in case of success than in case of failure.291
Before the project starts, the principal provides the agent with initial wealth y0, a part of which292
is paid in terms of the security. The agent can also invest in this security for saving purpose.6 At293
any point in time before the whole project is completed, the agent decides whether to exert effort294
or shirk, how much to consume, and how much to invest in this security subject to a minimum295
holding requirement y
n
which depends on the stage level n. The principal’s objective is to design296
the security and the minimum holding requirements properly so that the agent will always exert297
effort and, more importantly, choose the same consumption path as the one in the optimal contract298
derived in Section 3 that minimizes the principal’s costs.299
To describe the design of state-contingent security, we first explain how the value of the security300
changes over time across different states in a more intuitive discrete-time approximation of the301
continuous-time setting. In the discrete-time approximation, each period lasts ∆t. At the beginning302
of each period, the outcome of the project and the value of the security that the agent takes from303
the last period are realized. Then, the agent makes effort, consumption, and investment decisions304
based on his observation of the outcomes (Figure 2). If the agent exerts effort, the project succeeds305
with probability approximately λ∆t and fails with probability 1 − λ∆t, and the result will be306
realized at the beginning of the next period. If the agent shirks, the project fails with probability307
6We first assume that investing in this security is the only saving technology of the agent. A case with hidden
saving is studied in the appendix.
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The agent makes consumption, 
effort, and investment decisions
The agent makes consumption, 
effort, and investment decisions
The outcome of the project and the
 value of the security are realized
The outcome of the project and the
 value of the security are realized
Figure 2: The timeline
1. For the valuation of the security, suppose the project is at stage n in period t and that the308
agent holds in period t the amount of security that would be worth yt+1 in period t + 1 if the309
project fails. Denote by Yn+1(yt+1) the value of such a security in state of success. The value310
of this amount of securities in the current period t is determined by the fair-price rule assuming311
that the agent exerts effort, i.e., the value equals the expected present value, which is given by312
Pn(yt+1) =
1
1+r∆t [(1 − λ∆t)yt+1 + λ∆tYn+1(yt+1)] (Figure 3). For easier tracking of the agent’s
Figure 3: The design of the state-contingent security
313
wealth level, we write the value of the security in the current period and in the next period in314
case of success as functions of its value in the next period in case of failure. Given this design315
of state-contingent security, if the agent allocates Pn(yt+1) of his current wealth to the security,316
then in next period his wealth level equals yt+1 in case of failure and Yn+1(yt+1) in case of success.317
Letting yt denote the agent’s wealth in period t, his budget constraint in period t is318
rct∆t+ Pn(yt+1) = yt,
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where the first term on the left-hand side is his consumption in the current period, and the second319
term is his investment in the security if he wants a guaranteed wealth level of yt+1 in case of failure320
in the next period.7321
To derive the evolution of the agent’s wealth in continuous time, we first substitute the expression322




[(1− λ∆t)yt+1 + λ∆tYn+1(yt+1)] = yt.
Multiplying both sides by 1 + r∆t and rearranging the equation, we can get324
yt+1 − yt = r∆tyt − (1 + r∆t)rct∆t− λ∆t[Yn+1(yt+1)− yt+1].
Dividing both sides by ∆t and letting ∆t converge to 0, we can obtain the evolution of the agent’s325
wealth in case of failure326
dy
dt
= ry − rc− λ[Yn+1(y)− y].
Thus, when the project is at stage n, the agent’s wealth in case of failure grows at rate r and327
decreases because of consumption spending c and the loss on investment in security λ(Yn+1(y)−y).328
If the agent succeeds, his wealth raises to Yn+1(y).329
Now, the agent’s problem is to choose an effort process and a consumption plan to maximize330
his discounted expected utility. In the recursive form of the agent’s problem, the state variable331
becomes his wealth level y. Let Vn(y) be the maximum expected utility that the agent can get332
given wealth level y when the project is at stage n. The HJB equation of the agent’s problem is333
rVn(y) = max
a,c











Different from the benchmark model, the agent now chooses both the action and consumption. If335
the agent decides to work (a = 1), he incurs the costs of exerting effort in exchange for a higher336
7The functional form of Yn+1(y) and Pn(y) depend on the agent’s utility function, and therefore they are nonlinear
for general risk-averse utility functions. In the next section, we will provide an example for a special case where both
Yn+1(y) and Pn(y) take a simple linear form.
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return on his securities when the project progresses to the next stage. If the agent shirks (a = 0),337
although he does not suffer any costs of working, he loses the chance to receive the higher return338
from his securities. In continuous time, the value of the agent’s investment in the security converges339
to his wealth level y at any point in time. Since the agent is required to meet a minimum holding340
requirement that he invests at least y
n
of his wealth in the security, it imposes a lower bound of341
the state variable y at y
n
when the project is at stage n.342
The next proposition shows that if the principal sets the initial wealth, the payoff in case343
of success, and the minimum holding requirement appropriately, this implementation is able to344
generate the same consumption path and effort choice as the original optimal contract. The proof345
is in the appendix.346
Proposition 4.1 Suppose the principal provides the agent with initial wealth y0347
y0 = C1(v
0),






















and he chooses the same consumption process as the one in the optimal contract and always exerts350






For the payoff in case of success Yn+1(y), note that Cn+1(C−1n (y) + rlλ ) is well defined for353
y ≥ Cn(0). When y ≥ Cn(0), we have Yn+1(y) is increasing in y, and Yn+1(y) = Cn+1(C−1n (y) +354
rl
λ ) > Cn(C
−1
n (y)) = y, which means the payoff of the security in case of success is higher than its355
payoff in case of failure. For y < Cn(0), intuitively, the payoff Yn+1(y) should satisfy the following356
conditions. Firstly, the payoff should be higher when the agent holds more security, which means357
Yn+1(y) is strictly increasing in y. Secondly, the payoff in case of success should be higher than the358
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payoff in case of failure, which requires that Yn+1(y) > y. Finally, the payoff should be zero when359
the agent does not hold any security, and hence Yn+1(y) = 0 when y = 0. In this “off equilibrium360
region”, we could choose any function that satisfies these conditions. In Proposition 4.1, we choose361
the simplest linear function that connects the origin and (Cn(0), Cn+1( rlλ )).362
The premise of this implementation lies in the fact that the agent’s utility maximization problem363
is the dual problem of the principal’s cost minimization problem in Section 3. Given continuation364
utility v, Cn(v) is the minimum expected cost to finance the incentive-compatible compensation365
scheme. From the dual perspective, given the expected wealth y = Cn(v), the maximum expected366
utility that the agent can achieve should equal v. Further, the consumption allocation should be367
the same. In this implementation, the agent invests in the risky security for saving purpose, and368
hence the return on savings is state contingent. When the state-dependent rates of return are369
chosen appropriately, the agent’s Euler equation mimics the inverse Euler equation implied by the370
principal’s problem. In other words, the wedge between the Euler equation and the inverse Euler371
equation, as stated in Rogerson (1985), disappears.372
In this implementation, the state-contingent security plays a key role in incentives. As discussed373
in Section 3, the principal has to let the agent bear some risks; otherwise, the agent will shirk his374
work. In the implementation, the risks are embedded in the state-contingent security. The gap375
between the value in case of success and in case of failure guarantees that the agent will exert376
effort. The minimum holding requirement arises because, by assumption, the agent has limited377
liability and hence can guarantee a utility level of 0. It is binding when the highest expected utility378
the agent can achieve reaches the lower bound 0. At this point, the principal has to make sure that379
the agent holds enough securities so that the payoff of these securities in case of success is sufficient380
to deliver the agent with continuation utility rlλ , which is the lowest level in case of success for the381
agent to exert effort. Otherwise, the agent will not have any incentive to work. Hence, the minimum382
holding requirement ensures the lowest level of risk that can incentivize the agent to exert effort.383
Proposition 4.1 shows that the minimum holding requirement is relaxed after each innovation. This384
is because when the project progresses to the next stage, the uncertainty of the project reduces,385
and the minimum level of risks to be borne by the agent for incentive purposes also becomes less.386
The design of security depends on the agent’s attitude towards risk, which is determined by his387
utility function from consumption. In the next section, we explicitly show how to use the equity388
of the firm to create the security when the agent has logarithmic utility. For general cases, in the389
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financial market, there is no asset that has the exact same payoff structure as the state-contingent390
security used in this implementation. However, firms can still design equity-based compensation391
to approximate the security that implements the optimal contract. Since these firms rely heavily392
on R&D, the performance of the employees in the R&D units greatly influences the firms’ per-393
formance outcomes, which closely links employees’ performance and the return on firms’ equities.394
In particular, each breakthrough in R&D is followed by a notable increase in the firm’s equity395
price. The absence of such developments in a firm over a period generally leads to a drop in its396
equity price. Thus, among all available assets, the firm’s equity has the closest payoff-pattern to397
the state-contingent security. Another feature of this implementation is the sequence of decreasing398
minimum holding requirements that the agent has to meet until the completion of the project. In399
practice, this feature is mimicked by using performance-vesting provisions, under which a part of400
equity grants is vested when the research employee achieves a predetermined performance target.401
5 The optimality of equity‐based compensation under loga-402
rithmic utility403
In this section, we consider an example in which the agent has the logarithmic utility function.404
In this case, the contracting problem has a closed-form solution, which allows us to create the405
security that implements the optimal contract in Section 4 using the equity of a firm under some406
assumptions about how the development of the project affects the firm’s value.407
5.1 The optimal contract and equity-based implementation408
If the agent’s utility from consumption is U(c) = ln c, we can show that the principal’s minimum409
cost function takes a simple form—a constant times ev, where the constant only depends on the410
parameters of the model and the stage level of the project. The following proposition summarizes411
the property of the optimal contract.412
Proposition 5.1 When the agent’s utility from consumption is U(c) = ln c, the minimum cost of413
delivering continuation utility v when the project is at stage n is given by Cn(v) = pnev, where the414
constant pn is determined recursively by415
pN+1 = 1,
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rpn ln pn + λpn = λpn+1e
rl
λ ,
and satisfies pn > pn+1. When the agent completes an innovation, he enters the next stage and416
starts with continuation utility v̄ which satisfies v̄ = v + rlλ . In case of failure, the continuation417
utility v evolves according to dvdt = −r ln pn < 0.418
The optimal contract for the logarithmic utility example is consistent with the results of Propo-419
sition 3.1: (1) the continuation utility decreases over time in case of failure and increases by rlλ420
after each success; (2) pn > pn+1 implies that the cost of delivering the same level of continuation421
utility is higher when the project is at an earlier stage.422
The closed-form solution allows us to derive some comparative statics results regarding how423
the principal’s cost is affected by the agent’s cost of exerting effort and the difficulty of the R&D424
project, which are captured by l and λ respectively. The principal’s cost will be higher when the425
agent incurs a higher cost of exerting effort because the principal needs to compensate the agent426
more to cover his cost of effort. How the difficulty of the R&D project affects the principal’s cost427
is unclear. When the arrival rate of success λ is very small, which means the R&D project is very428
challenging, the principal needs to provide a stronger incentive for the agent to exert effort. On the429
one hand, the agent will receive a higher reward in case of success which increases the principal’s430
cost, but on the other hand, the principal will punish the agent harder when he fails by lowering431
his continuation utility quicker, which leads to a lower and more rapidly decreasing consumption432
path in case of failure. In other words, the principal provides a stronger incentive for the agent by433
making his consumption path more volatile. The following corollary shows that the net effect is to434
increase the principal’s cost.435
Corollary 5.2 The principal’s cost of delivering continuation utility v at any stage n is higher436
when the agent has a higher cost of exerting effort, or a lower chance of success, i.e.,437
∂pn
∂l
> 0 and ∂pn
∂λ
< 0.
To implement the optimal contract, we consider a security with the same payoff structure438
described in Section 4. As shown in Section 4, when the agent invests in this security for saving439
purpose, at stage n, the agent’s wealth in case of failure grows at rate r and decreases because of440
consumption spending c and the loss on investment in security λ(Yn+1(y)−y). Hence, the evolution441
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of the agent’s wealth in case of failure satisfies442
dy
dt
= ry − rc− λ[Yn+1(y)− y].
If the agent succeeds, his wealth raises to Yn+1(y). To replicate the consumption path of the optimal443




















in case of success, which is a linear function of y.8 The following proposition confirms that the446
implementation indeed replicates the optimal contract.447












Then, given income y, the highest discounted expected utility the agent can achieve is450
Vn(y) = ln y − ln pn,
and he chooses the same consumption process as the one in the optimal contract and always exerts451
effort until he completes the last-stage innovation.452
From Proposition 5.3, the risky security that implements the optimal contract has a simple453
structure: (1) the value of the security increases proportionally by ( r ln pnλ + 1) times when the454
project progresses from stage n to stage n+ 1; (2) by fair-pricing rule, in case of failure, the value455
of the security evolves according to456
dy
dt








= r(1− ln pn)y.
Note that, in case of failure, the value of the risky security also changes proportionally, and its return457
equals r(1− ln pn). Since the logarithmic utility function is unbounded from below, the minimum458
holding requirement in Proposition 4.1 no-longer exists. In the logarithmic utility example, to459
8The last equality is due to rpn ln pn + λpn = λpn+1e
rl
λ from Proposition 5.1.
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provide incentive, the value of the security increases proportionally by r ln pnλ + 1 times in case of460
success and depreciates at rate r ln pn in case of failure. Since pn > pn+1, Proposition 5.3 implies461
the security is more volatile at an earlier stage. The intuition behind this result is again that the462
principal needs the agent to bear some risks in order to provide an incentive to work. When the463
project progresses to the next stage, the uncertainty of the project reduces, and hence the risk that464
the agent needs to take for incentive purpose also reduces.465
Proposition 5.3 shows that the value of the risky security that implements the optimal contract466
increases proportionally after each success. If the firm’s value changes in a similar pattern, then we467
might be able to create the security using the firm’s equity. It requires that: 1) the firm’s value is468
only affected by the performance of the project; 2) the firm’s value increases proportionally when469
the project progresses to the next stage. This pattern is consistent with the development of R&D-470
intensive start-up firms because the development of these firms usually starts with one main research471
project and the firms’ value depends crucially on the performance of the project. Regarding how472
the performance of the project changes the firm’s value, although it is difficult to find data about473
how a specific project affects the value of the firm, most R&D-intensive start-up firms are backed by474
venture capital, and the valuation of the firms at each financing round is publicly available. Since475
whether a start-up firm can receive further rounds of financing depends on the development of its476
main project, an alternative approach to examine how the development of its main project affects477
the firm’s value is to look at the change of the valuation of the firm at each financing round. From478
2007 to 2011, Twitter received seven rounds of financing, and its valuation increased roughly three479
times at each financing round. A similar proportionate growth pattern is documented in Venture480
Pulse Report published quarterly by KPMG.481
If the firm’s value increases proportionally by Rn times when its project progresses from stage482
n to stage n+ 1. We first assume that Rn is certain and discuss how the uncertainty of Rn affects483
the results in the next subsection. Let k be the value of the firm. Under this assumption, the firm’s484
value in case of failure evolves according to485
dk
dt
= rk − λ(Rnk − k) = [r − λ(Rn − 1)]k,
which implies that the return of the firm’s equity in case of failure equals [r−λ(Rn − 1)]. Consider486
the following portfolio of the firm’s equity and a risk-free asset with interest rate r, in which the487
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fraction of equity in the portfolio αn satisfies488






By construction, the return of the portfolio in case of failure equals to r(1− ln pn), and the value of490
the portfolio increases by αn ·Rn +(1−αn) · 1 = r ln pnλ +1 times when the project progresses from491
stage n to stage n + 1.9 Thus, the payoff of the portfolio matches exactly with the payoff of the492
risky security that implements the optimal contract. The construction of the portfolio also requires493
that Rn ≥ r ln pnλ + 1 so that αn ∈ [0, 1] for any n. It means that the growth rate of the firm’s494
value in case of success is higher than the required return of the security in case of success, which495
is also a sufficient condition on the return of the project so that it is always optimal to implement496
the positive effort. The following proposition summarizes these results.497
Proposition 5.4 Suppose the value of the firm increases by Rn times when the project progresses498
from stage n to stage n + 1. If Rn ≥ r ln pnλ + 1 for all n, then the risky security that implements499
the optimal contract can be created by a portfolio of the firm’s equity and a risk-free asset with500





Proposition 5.4 shows that the fraction of equity in the portfolio depends only on the stage level502
of the project and the parameters of the model. To implement the optimal contract, the principal503
can offer the agent a wealth level of p1ev0 before the project starts, let him have access to the504
portfolio for investment for future consumption, and adjust the fraction of equity in the portfolio505
according to the stage level of the project. The agent makes all the remaining decisions, including506
consumption, investment, and effort choices. Proposition 5.3 shows that the agent will choose the507
same consumption path as the one in the optimal contract and always exerts effort. This result508
again shows that the composition of the equity-based incentive compensation should depend on the509
agent’s performance. From the determination of the fraction of equity in Proposition 5.4, if the510
9Since the value of the risk-free asset dons not depend on the outcome of the project, the fraction of the risk-free
asset 1− αn is multiplied by 1.
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firm’s value increases by the same proportion after each success, then the fraction of equity in the511
compensation portfolio decreases when the project progresses to a higher stage and a fraction of512
equity vests after each success.513
A direct implication of Corollary 5.2 is how the share of equity in the optimal portfolio changes514
with the cost of exerting effort, the difficulty of innovation, as well as the impact of innovation on515
the firm’s value Rn.516
Corollary 5.5 The share of equity in the optimal portfolio is higher when the agent has a higher517







< 0, and ∂αn
∂Rn
< 0.
The intuition of these comparative statics results is straightforward. When the agent has a higher520
cost of exerting effort or a lower chance of success, the principal needs to provide stronger incentive521
for the agent to work, and hence the optimal compensation portfolio should include more of the522
firm’s equity. Holding everything else constant, when the firm’s value is very sensitive to the523
development of the R&D project, a small share of equity is enough to ensure incentive. Some testable524
implications of these results are that research employees receive more equity-based compensation525
when each breakthrough of the project takes longer time on average, or when the variation of equity526
price is smaller when any news of the development of the project is revealed.527
5.2 The limitation of equity-based compensation528
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the limitations of the equity implementation results. In the529
previous subsection, we assumed that the firm’s value grow by a certain proportion when the project530
progresses from one stage to the next. In reality, however, the firm’s value faces two important types531
of uncertainty. Firstly, the firm faces the aggregate uncertainty of the market which will also affect532
its equity price. Secondly, the valuation of the firm’s R&D project may also be uncertain, i.e., the533
growing proportion of the firm’s value in case of success, Rn, is uncertain. For these situations, using534
equity-based incentive compensation lets the agent face the uncertainties that he can not control,535
and as a result, the principal needs to compensate the agent more for bearing the unnecessary risks.536
It implies that the second-best consumption allocation of the optimal contract cannot be achieved537
by using equity-based incentive compensation when these two types of uncertainty exist. When the538
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firm is cash constrained and chooses to use equity-based incentive compensation for its research539
employee, to increase efficiency, the firm should try to reduce the unnecessary risks faced by its540
employees as much as possible. For aggregate uncertainty, one approach is to add a short position541
of a market portfolio (for example a short position of index future) in the compensation portfolio to542
hedge the aggregate risk so that the research employees are effectively paid according to the firm’s543
performance relative to a benchmark. The approach of using the relative-performance evaluation544
scheme to remove the market aggregate risk inherent in equity-based incentive compensation has545
been extensively discussed in executive compensation literature since the theoretical prediction546
in Holmstrom (1982), which suggests that “the market component of a firm’s returns should be547
removed from the compensation package since executives cannot affect the overall market by their548
actions and it is costly for executives to bear the related risks.” For the uncertainty of valuation of549
the firm’s research project, however, it is difficult to find a financial tool to hedge the risk. Next,550
we use a two-period model to explain how it affects the efficiency of equity-based compensation.551
Now, suppose a research project lasts for two periods. In period 0, the agent decides whether to552
exert effort or shirk. Conditional on exerting effort, the agent succeeds with probability µ in period553
1. If he chooses to shirk, he fails with probability 1. The agent consumes in both period, and the554
utility function from consumption equals U(c) = ln c. The agent’s initial requisite utility equals v0.555
Let l be the disutility of exerting effort and β be the discount rate. As to how the performance of556
the project affects the firm’s value, in general, the firm’s value equals to its real value plus a random557
noise. Specifically, the firm’s period-1 value equals k + σ in case of failure, and its value equals to558
R̃k+σ in case of success, where the random variable R̃ captures the uncertainty of the valuation of559
the project and random variable σ captures the aggregate uncertainty. Since we want to focus on560
the effect of the uncertainty of the valuation of the project, we consider an extreme case in which561
the firm can hedge the aggregate uncertainty perfectly, and the only uncertainty comes from the562
firm’s value when the project succeeds. In this case, for a certain amount of the firm’s equity, its563
period-1 value in case of success equals R̃ times its value in case of failure. We also assume that the564
return of the project is sufficient high, which satisfies E(ln R̃) > lβµ , so that it is optimal to induce565
positive effort. We have the following result.566
Proposition 5.6 If R̃ is certain and equals R̄, then the second-best outcome (the optimal contract)567
can be implemented by a portfolio of the firm’s equity and a risk-free asset. If R̃ is a random variable568
with mean R̄, then the firm still can use a portfolio of the firm’s equity and a risk-free asset to569
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induce incentive, but incurs higher costs of delivering the same level of initial requisite utility v0 to570
the agent than the second-best outcome. The efficiency loss is lower when the distribution of R̃ is571
more concentrated around its mean R̄.572
The implication of Proposition 5.6 is that if the firm can make an more accurate prediction of the573
valuation of its project, then it can achieve very close to the optimal contract by using equity-based574
compensation.575
6 An implementation via performance‐based bonuses576
Equity-based compensation is attractive to cash-constrained start-up firms because it can in-577
centivize their research employees without spending their precious cash. However, it also has some578
limitations as discussed in the previous section. In firms with enough cash flow, performance-579
based bonus is another commonly used compensation scheme to provide incentive for research580
employees. In this section, we provide an alternative implementation of the optimal contract via581
performance‐based bonuses for situations in which equity-based compensation becomes less efficient.582
We keep the assumption that the agent has logarithmic utility function. Before the project583
starts, the principal offers a savings account to the agent with an initial balance of y0. When the584
project is at stage n, the principal sets the return on this account at rn in case of failure. In case of585
success, the principal rewards the agent with a performance bonus and deposits it into the savings586
account to increase its balance from y to Yn+1(y). Note that the size of the bonus depends on the587
balance of the savings account and the progress of the project. At any point in time, the agent588
can withdraw money from the savings account for consumption subject to the constraint that the589
balance of the savings account is nonnegative. Then, the balance of the savings account in case of590
failure evolves according to591
dy
dt
= rny − rc.
In case of success, the balance of the account increases from y to Yn+1(y). Similar to Proposition592
5.3, we can show that if the principal chooses y0, rn, and Yn+1(y) appropriately, the agent will593
always exert effort and choose the exact same consumption allocation as the optimal contract.594














Then, the agent chooses the same consumption process as the one in the optimal contract and598
always exerts effort until he completes the last-stage innovation.599
The balance of the savings account y in this implementation plays a similar role to the agent’s600
wealth level y in the equity-based implementation in Subsection 5.1. Both of them capture the601
agent’s expected income from the contract and serve as the state variable in the agent’s utility602
maximization problem. Therefore, if the evolutions of y are the same, then both implementations603
generate the same consumption allocation as in the optimal contract. The main difference between604
these two implementations is the approach to control the evolution of y. In equity-based implemen-605
tation, the principal adjusts the fraction of equity in the compensation portfolio according to the606
stage level, and then the equity-based compensation scheme automatically determines the evolu-607
tion of the agent’s wealth y. In performance-bonus implementation, the principal manually controls608
the evolution of the balance of the savings account y through the bonus for success. Comparing609
these two implementations, the advantage of using performance-based bonuses is that the agent610
does not bear any unnecessary risks brought by equity-based incentive compensation. However,611
the principal needs to monitor the balance of the account since the agent is risk-averse and hence612
the size of the bonus for success depends on the balance. The advantage of equity-based incentive613
compensation lies in its simplicity for which the principal only needs to adjust the faction of equity614
in the compensation portfolio depending on the development of the project and can leave all other615
decision problems to the agent.616
7 Conclusion617
To examine the optimality of the equity-based compensation scheme that is widely used by R&D-618
intensive start-up firms for their research employees, we study a dynamic contracting problem in619
which a principal hires an agent to perform a multi-stage R&D project. The R&D process is modeled620
by a Poisson process. In the optimal contract, the principal provides incentive to the agents in two621
ways: (1) the agent’s compensation increases to a higher level when he completes an innovation622
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(reward); (2) if the agent fails to complete the innovation, his compensation decreases continuously623
over time (punishment). We show that the optimal contract could be implemented using a risky624
security that appreciates when the project succeeds and depreciates when it fails. Until the agent625
completes the whole project, he is required to meet a sequence of holding requirements which are626
relaxed each time when the project progresses to the next stage. In this implementation, instead627
of the principal directly controlling the agent’s consumption as in the optimal contract, the agent628
chooses both consumption level and effort level. We show that this implementation yields the same629
consumption allocation as the one in the optimal contract. We also provide an example in which630
the contracting problem has a closed-form solution and explicitly describe how to use the equity631
of the firm to implement the optimal contract. This implementation suggests that the structure of632
equity-based compensation should relate to the research employees’ performance, and it provides633
a rationale for using the performance-vested equity-based compensation in R&D-intensive start-up634
firms from the theoretical point of view.635
Appendix A: Proofs636
Proof of Proposition 3.1637
The proof of Proposition 3.1 in Shan (2017) proves points (i) to (iv). Cn(v) > Cn+1(v) for all638
v is by Corollary 3.2 in Shan (2017). Proposition 3.1 in Shan (2017) shows that the derivative of639
the cost function Cn(v) satisfies S′(v) < C ′n(v) < C ′n+1(v + rlλ ). Since the utility function U(c)640
satisfies the Inada condition limc→+∞ U ′(c) = 0, we have limv→+∞ S′(v) = +∞, which implies that641
limv→+∞ C
′







it follows that Cn(v) < Cn+1(v + rlλ ) for all v.643
How to replicate the inverse Euler equitation in a two-period model644
Before proving Proposition 4.1, we first illustrate the principle of the implementation in a two-645
period model in which the agent chooses action and consumption in the first period and the outcome646
of the project is realized in the second period. If the agent works in the first period, the project647
succeeds with probability µ. If he shirks, it fails with probability 1. In the first period, the agent’s648
chooses the consumption c and security holding y given initial wealth level y subject to the following649
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budget constraint650
c+ P (y) = y.
The price of security are given by the discounted expected value of the security651
P (y) = β[(µY (y) + (1− µ)y)],
where y is the payoff of the security in case of failure, Y (y) is the payoff in case of success, and β652
is the discount factor. Thus, the agent’s problem is653
max
c,a
U(c)− al + β[aµU(Y (y)) + (1− µa)U(y)]
s.t.654
c+ β[(µY (y) + (1− µ)y)] = y.
If the principal set Y (y) = U−1(U(y) + lβµ ), consider the agent’s choice of effort, we have655
−l + β[µU(Y (y)) + (1− µ)U(y)] = βU(y).
It implies that the agent is indifferent between working and shirking no matter what consumption656
level he chooses. For the consumption choice, if the agent decides to save one unit consumption657
and invest it in the security in the first period, then in the second period658
∆y =
1
β[µY ′(y) + (1− µ)]
, and ∆Y (y) =
Y ′(y)
β[µY ′(y) + (1− µ)]
,




µY ′(y) + (1− µ)
.
When the agent chooses to work a = 1, the Euler equation becomes661
U ′(c) =
µY ′(y)U ′(Y (y))
µY ′(y) + (1− µ)
+
(1− µ)U ′(y)
µY ′(y) + (1− µ)
.
Note that Y (y) = U−1(U(y) + lβµ ). Hence, Y ′(y) =
U ′(y)
U ′(Y (y)) , which implies that662
µY ′(y)U ′(Y (y))
µY ′(y) + (1− µ)
+
(1− µ)U ′(y)
µY ′(y) + (1− µ)
=
U ′(y)
µY ′(y) + (1− µ)
.




µY ′(y) + (1− µ)
.
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Thus, if the principal set Y (y) = U−1(U(y) + lβµ ), the agent is willing to exert effort, and the joint665
deviation strategy of shirking and saving can be ruled out. Finally, taking the reciprocal of both666































which is exactly the inverse Euler equation implied by the principal’s problem. This result confirms670
that the implementation rules out the joint-deviation strategy.671
Proof of Proposition 4.1672
Since Cn is a strictly increasing and differentiable function by Proposition 3.1, C−1n exists and673
is also differentiable. We first show that Vn(y), which is the maximum expected utility that the674
agent can achieve given the expected wealth y, equals C−1n (y) for any n (0 < n ≤ N + 1). This is675
obviously true when the agent completes the last stage and receives a lump-sum transfer, because676
VN+1(y) = U(y) = S
−1(y) = C−1N+1(y). Next, for any stage n, taking Vn+1(y) = C
−1
n+1(y) as a known677
function, we verify that Vn(y) = C−1n (y) is one solution to the value function of the following HJB678
equation for the agent’s problem under the conditions of Proposition 4.1,679
rVn(y) = max
a,c











Next, we show that Vn(y) = C−1n (y) is the true value function for the agent’s utility maximization681
problem in stage n, and hence the consumption path implied by the value function is a true solution682
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to the agent’s problem. If this is true, then we can show that Vn(y) = C−1n (y) is the true value683
function for the agent’s problem for any n (0 < n ≤ N + 1) by backward induction.684
Step 1: Verify that Vn(y) = C−1n (y) is one solution to the HJB equation.685
To verify that Vn(y) = C−1n (y) satisfies the HJB equation, we plug Vn(y) = C−1n (y) and its686
derivative V ′n(y) = 1C′n(C−1n (y)) into both sides of the HJB equation and show that the equation holds.687
For the right-hand side, we first consider the agent’s decision for action a. Letting Vn(y) = C−1n (y),688
we have689







))− C−1n (y)]− rl
= λ[C−1n (y) +
rl
λ
− C−1n (y)]− rl
= 0.
Then, for either choice of action a, the right-hand side of the HJB equation becomes690
RHS = max
c
rU(c) + V ′n(y){ry − rc− λ[Yn+1(y)− y]}.



















where c∗(y) is the optimal choice of consumption which is determined by the first-order condition692









. Since, from principal’s problem, Cn(v)694
satisfies the following differential equation695
(r + λ)Cn(v) = rS(u









(r + λ)Cn(v)− rS(u∗(v))− λCn+1(v + rlλ )
.






r[C−1n (y)− u∗(C−1n (y))]
(r + λ)Cn(C
−1
n (y))− rS(u∗(C−1n (y))− λCn+1(C−1n (y) + rlλ )
=
r[C−1n (y)− u∗(C−1n (y))]
(r + λ)y − rS(u∗(C−1n (y)))− λCn+1(C−1n (y) + rlλ )
,
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and u∗(C−1n (y)) satisfies S′(u∗(C−1n (y))) = C ′n(C−1n (y)). Note that S(u) = U−1(u), it implies that698








, it follows that U ′(S(u∗(C−1n (y)))) = U ′(c∗(y)). Because the utility700
function U is strictly concave, we then have S(u∗(C−1n (y))) = c∗(y), and hence u∗(C−1n (y)) =701








(r + λ)y − rc∗(y)− λCn+1(C−1n (y) + rlλ )
.




into the right-hand side of the HJB equation, we have704
RHS = rU(c∗(y)) +




= rU(c∗(y)) + r[C−1n (y)− U(c∗(y))]
= rC−1n (y)
For the left-hand side, we have705
LHS = rVn(y) = rC
−1
n (y).
Thus, Vn(y) = C−1n (y) is one solution to the HJB equation of the agent’s problem.706
Step 2: Check that the path of wealth y (or security holding) implied by the HJB equation given707
value function Vn(y) = C−1n (y) does not violate the minimum holding requirement y ≥ yn.708
Since the payoff of the security in case of success is strictly increasing in y, if the agent invests709
less than y
n
in the security, by the design of the security, the payoff in case of success is less than710
Cn+1(
rl
λ ), and hence the expected utility that the agent can derive from this amount of wealth when711
he enters stage n+1 is less than C−1n+1(Cn+1( rlλ )) =
rl
λ . To induce incentive, the agent’s continuation712
utility needs to increase by at least rlλ . Since in stage n the agent can always guarantee 0 utility by713
doing noting, if he knows that the highest utility he can receive in case of success is less than rlλ ,714
he will not have any incentive to work. Intuitively, the minimum holding requirement ensures that715
the agent has sufficient equity in the future to induce effort. The minimum holding requirement716
imposes a condition at the lower bound of y that dydt ≥ 0 when y reaches the lower bound yn because717
y cannot decrease any further when it hits the lower bound. Our next task is to check this condition718











When y reaches the lower bound y
n
, the agent’s choice of consumption satisfies720
c∗(y
n
) = S(u∗(C−1n (yn))) = S(u
∗(0)) = S(0),
where u∗(0) = 0 is because from Proposition 3.1 we have S′(u∗(0)) = C ′n(0) and the boundary721
condition C ′n(0) = S′(0) = 0 when the continuation utility reaches the lower bound 0 in the722









)− λ[Yn+1(yn)− yn] = rCn(0)− λ[Cn+1(
rl
λ
)− Cn(0)] = 0,
where the last equality is because Cn(0) = λCn+1(
rl
λ )
r+λ from Proposition 3.1. Therefore, the boundary724
condition for y is satisfied.725
Step 3: Verify that Vn(y) = C−1n (y) is the true value function of the agent’s maximization726
problem and the consumption path implied by the HJB equation given value function Vn(y) = C−1n (y)727
is the same as the consumption path of the optimal contract.728
Let the time when the stage n problem starts be 0 and let y0 be the wealth at the beginning of729
stage n. When the project remains in stage n, the state variable yt evolves according to730
dy
dt
= ry − rc− λ[Yn+1(y)− y].
Since Cn(v) < Cn+1(v + rlλ ), we have Yn+1(y) = Cn+1(C−1n (y) +
rl
λ ) > Cn(C
−1




= ry − rc− λ[Yn+1(y)− y] ≤ ry.
Hence, for any feasible path of the state variable {yt}t≥0, we have yt ≤ erty0. Since Cn(v) is733
a strictly increasing function and satisfies limv→+∞ C ′n(v) = +∞, we have Vn(y) = C−1n (y) is734
a strictly increasing function and satisfies and limy→+∞ V ′n(y) = 0. Since Vn(yn) = 0, we have735















where the first equality is by L’Hôpital’s rule. It shows that Vn(y) = C−1n (y) satisfies the transver-737
sality condition limt→+∞ e−rtVn(yt) = 0 for any feasible path of the state variable {yt}t≥0.10738
10This condition is the continuous-time version of the condition in Theorem 4.3 in Stokey and Lucas (1989). In
the supplement of this paper, we provide a proof that if a function is one solution to the HJB equation and satisfies
the transversality condition, then the function is the true value function.
32
Therefore, Vn(y) = C−1n (y) is the true value function of the agent’s maximization problem, and the739
consumption path implied by the HJB equation given value function Vn(y) = C−1n (y) is the true740
solution to the agent’s problem.741
Our next task is to show that the consumption path chosen by the agent is the same as the742
consumption path of the optimal contract. We can interpret Vn(y) as the agent’s “continuation743



















Thus, if Yn+1(y) = Cn+1(C−1n (y) + rlλ ) then the agent is always indifferent between working and746
shirking no matter what his consumption choice is. Moreover, the agent’s optimal choices of con-747
sumption for the two actions are the same because they satisfy the same first-order condition748
U ′(c) = V ′n(y). Thus, the agent is always willing to exert effort and cannot achieve higher utility749
through the joint-deviation strategy by shirking and saving. In case of failure, his “continuation750







where c∗(y) is the optimal choice of consumption given y and satisfies U ′(c∗(y)) = V ′n(y), and the752
last equality is derived from the agent’s HJB equation. From the principal’s problem in Section 3,753
since the incentive-compatibility condition is always binding so that v̄ = v + rlλ , in case of failure,754
the continuation utility evolves according to755
dv
dt
= rv − ru∗(v),
where u∗(v) is the optimal choice of utility flow and satisfies S′(u∗(v)) = C ′n(v). The previous proof756
has shown that if v = Vn(y) = C−1n (y) then u∗(v) = u∗(C−1n (y)) = U(c∗(y)), which means that the757
optimal utility flow given continuation utility level C−1n (y) in the principal’s problem equals the758
agent’s utility from the optimal consumption choice given wealth level y in the agent’s problem.759
Therefore, given the same continuation utility, the agent chooses the same level of consumption as760
the optimal contract, which further induces the same dynamics of the continuation utility. Thus,761
the optimal consumption path for the agent’s problem is the same as the consumption path of the762
optimal contract.763
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Finally, since we have verified that VN+1(y) = C−1N+1(y), we can show that Vn(y) = C−1n (y) is764
the true value function for the agent’s problem for any n (0 < n ≤ N + 1) by backward induction.765
Therefore, given the same continuation utility, the implementation and the optimal contract766
choose the same consumption level, which further induces the same dynamics of the continuation767
utility. Yn+1(y) = Cn+1(C−1n (y) + rlλ ) guarantees that the agent is always indifferent between768
working and shirking. The initial condition that y0 = C1(v0) guarantees that the agent starts with769
initial continuation-utility v0. Thus, the implementation and the optimal contract generate the770
same consumption path under all possible realization of the agent’s performance and the agent is771
always willing to exert effort.772
For the value of the minimum holding requirements, since y
n
= Cn(0) and Cn(0) > Cn+1(0) by773





Proof of Proposition 5.1775
For logarithmic utility function U(c) = ln(c), the cost of delivering u is S(u) = eu, and the cost776
of delivering the one-time transfer when the project is completed is CN+1(v) = ev. Suppose the777
stage n+ 1 cost function is Cn+1(v) = pn+1ev, where pn+1 is a constant. We first use a guess-and-778
verify method to show that the solution to the stage n HJB equation Cn(v) also takes the form of779
pne
v—a constant times ev.780
Taking Cn+1(v) = pn+1ev and the guess Cn(v) = pnev into the HJB equation, the left-hand781
becomes rpnev. If we can show that the right-hand side also takes the form of a constant times782
ev, then we can pin down the constant pn from the HJB equation, and the guess is verified. The783











= rv − r(u− l)− λ(v̄ − v),
λ(v̄ − v) ≥ rl.




which implies that u = v + ln pn.787
The incentive compatibility constraint must be binding, otherwise the principal can lower costs788
by offering a lower v̄. Hence, v̄ = v + rlλ , which implies that
dv
dt = rv − ru = −r ln pn. Taking the789
solution for u and v̄ into the right-hand side of the HJB equation, it becomes790
RHS = rpne
v + pne
v(−r ln pn) + λ(pn+1ev+
rl
λ − pnev)
= (rpn − rpn ln pn + λpn+1e
rl
λ − λpn)ev,
which also takes the form of a constant times ev. Finally, letting the left-hand side of the HJB791
equation equal the right-hand side, we have792
rpne




rpn ln pn + λpn = λpn+1e
rl
λ .
Therefore, if Cn+1(v) = pn+1ev, then Cn(v) also takes the form of pnev, where the constant pn is794
determined by the above equation given pn+1. When the agent completes the project, the principal’s795
cost of delivering the one-time transfer is CN+1(v) = ev, and hence pN+1 = 1. Then, by backward796
induction, the cost function at any stage n equals Cn(v) = pnev, where pn is determined recursively797
starting from pN+1 = 1.798
Next, we show that the constants satisfy pn > pn+1 by backward induction. Since pN+1 = 1,799
pN satisfies800
rpN ln pN + λpN = λe
rl
λ .
If pN = 1, then we have801
rpN ln pN + λpN = r ln 1 + λ = λ < λe
rl
λ .
Since rpN ln pN + λpN is an increasing function of pN , it implies that pN > 1 = pN+1.802
For any 0 < n ≤ N , we have803




rpn−1 ln pn−1 + λpn−1 = λpne
rl
λ .
Thus, pn > pn+1 implies that pn−1 > pn. We have shown that pN > pN+1. Applying backward805
induction, we can show that pn > pn+1 for all 0 < n ≤ N .806
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Proof of Corollary 5.2807
Since pn is determined recursively by808
rpn ln pn + λpn = λpn+1e
rl
λ .











r ln pn + r + λ
Since pn ≥ 1 and pn+1 ≥ 1, it implies that if ∂pn+1∂l ≥ 0, then
∂pn
∂l > 0. Note that pN+1 = 1 and810
hence ∂pN+1∂l = 0. Then,
∂pn
∂l > 0 for all n by backward induction.811













r ln pn + r + λ
< −





r ln pn + r + λ
,
where the last step is because ( rlλ − 1)e
rl
λ > −1.11 Since pn > pn+1 by Proposition 5.1, it implies813
that if ∂pn+1∂λ ≤ 0, then
∂pn
∂λ < 0. Once again, we can show that
∂pn
∂λ < 0 for all n by backward814
induction starting from the fact that ∂pN+1∂λ = 0.815
Proof of Proposition 5.3816
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.1. When the agent completes the last stage,817
his utility from the lump-sum payment equals VN+1(y) = ln y − ln pN+1, where pN+1 = 1. Next,818
given Vn+1(y) = ln y − ln pn+1 and Yn+1(y) = ( r ln pnλ + 1)y, we verify that Vn(y) = ln y − ln pn is819
the solution to the value function of the following HJB equation for the agent’s problem,820
rVn(y) = max
a,c
r[ln c− al] + V ′n(y)
dy
dt




= (r − r ln pn)y − rc.
If this is true, then we can show that Vn(y) = ln y − ln pn for any n (0 < n ≤ N + 1) by backward822
induction.823
11Let f(x) = (x− 1)ex + 1. We have f(0) = 0 and f ′(x) = xex > 0 for all x > 0. Hence, f(x) = (x− 1)ex + 1 > 0






To verify Vn(y) = ln y − ln pn is the solution of the HJB equation, we plug Vn(y) = ln y − ln pn824
and its derivative V ′n(y) = 1y into both sides and show that they are equal. For the right-hand side,825
we first consider the agent’s decision for action a. Letting Vn(y) = ln y − ln pn, we have826
λ{[ln(Yn+1(y))− ln pn+1]− Vn(y)} − rl = λ{[ln(
r ln pn
λ
+ 1)y − ln pn+1]− (ln y − ln pn)} − rl
= λ{[ln(r ln pn
λ
+ 1) + ln y − ln pn+1]− (ln y − ln pn)} − rl
= λ ln(
rpn ln pn + λpn
λpn+1
)− rl




where the forth equality is because pn satisfies827
rpn ln pn + λpn = λpn+1e
rl
λ .
Then, for either choice of action a, the right-hand side of the HJB equation becomes828
RHS = max
c
r ln c+ V ′n(y)[(r − r ln pn)y − rc].
Taking V ′n(y) = 1y into the above expression, we have829
RHS = r ln y +
1
y
[(r − r ln pn)y − rc].
The optimal choice of consumption satisfies the first-order condition rc∗(y) =
r
y , and hence c∗(y) = y.830
Then,831
RHS = r ln y +
1
y
[(r − r ln pn)y − ry] = r(ln y − ln pn).
For the left-hand side, we have832
LHS = rVn(y) = r(ln y − ln pn).
Thus, Vn(y) = ln y − ln pn is one solution to the HJB equation of the agent’s problem.833
For the dynamics of state variable y, we have834
dy
dt
= [(r − r ln pn)y − rc∗(y)] = (−r ln pn)y.
Thus, suppose the stage n problem starts at time 0 with wealthy level y0. If the project remains835
in stage n till time t, the wealth implied by the first-order condition of the HJB equation is y∗t =836
37












e−r ln pnty0 = 0.
This transversality condition implies that {y∗t }t≥0 is the true solution of the agent’s maximization838
problem, and hence Vn(y) = ln y − ln pn is the true value function of the agent’s maximization839
problem.12840
Next, we show that the implementation generates the same consumption path as the optimal841
contract. As in the proof of Proposition 4.1, we can interpret Vn(y) as the agent’s “continuation842
utility” given wealth y. We have shown that the agent is always indifferent between working843
and shirking because his “continuation utility” increases by rlλ after each success. Hence, the844
agent is always willing to exert effort. Given wealth level y, the optimal choice of consumption845
satisfies c∗(y) = y. Given “continuation utility” Vn(y), the utility flow from consumption equals846
r ln c∗(y) = r ln y = Vn(y) + ln pn. In case of failure, his “continuation utility” changes smoothly847






= rVn(y)− rU(c∗(y)) = r(ln y − ln pn)− r ln y = −r ln pn,
where c∗(y) is the optimal choice of consumption given y and satisfies c∗(y) = y. For the principal’s849
problem, Proposition 5.1 shows that given continuation utility v, the optimal choice of utility flow850
equals v + ln pn and, in case of failure, the continuation utility evolves according to851
dv
dt
= −r ln pn,
Therefore, given the same continuation utility, the agent chooses the same level of consumption as852
the optimal contract, which further induces the same dynamics of the continuation utility. The853
initial condition that y0 = C1(v0) guarantees that the agent starts with initial continuation-utility854
v0. Thus, the implementation and the optimal contract generate the same consumption path under855
all possible realization of the agent’s performance, and the agent is always willing to exert effort.856
Proof of Proposition 5.6857
To implement the optimal contract, the proof of a two-period implementation problem before the858
proof of Proposition 4.1 shows that the optimal contract can be implemented by a risky security that859
12We provide a proof that the transversality condition plus the first-order conditions are sufficient in the supplement
of this paper.
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satisfies the following property: 1) if the payoff of a certain amount of the security in case of failure860
equals y, then its payoff in case of success equals Y (y) = U−1(U(y) + lβµ ) = e
l
βµ y; 2) the period-0861
price of this amount of security is determined by fair-pricing rule and equals β(µY (y)+ (1−µ)y) =862
β[µe
l
βµ + (1 − µ)]y. We first consider the case in which R̃ is certain and equals R̄. For a certain863
amount of the firm’s equity, if its value equals y in case of failure, then its value equals R̄y in case864
of success. In this case, the risky security can be created by a portfolio of the firm’s equity and a865
risk-free asset where the fraction of equity α satisfies αR̄+ (1− α) = e
l
βµ . Therefore, if there is no866
uncertainty about the value of the project, the optimal contract (the second-best allocation) can be867
implemented by the equity of the firm. Given this portfolio, the agent is always indifferent between868
working and shirking. If his initial wealth is y0, the highest expected utility he can achieve is the869
solution to the following optimization problem870
V̄ (y0) = max
c
ln c+ β ln(y)
s.t.871
c+ β{[µ[αR̄+ (1− α)] + (1− µ)}y = y0.
Next, we study the case in which the value of the project is uncertain so that R̃ is random and872
calculate the third-best outcome when the principal can only use the firm’s equity and a risk-free873
asset to compensate the agent. Consider a portfolio of the firm’s equity and a risk-free asset where874
the fraction of equity equals α′. Then, if the value of the portfolio in case of failure equals y its875
value in case of success equals [α′R̃+ (1− α′)]y. The period-0 cost of this portfolio equals876
βE{µ[α′R̃+ (1− α′)]y + (1− µ)y} = β{µ[α′R̄+ (1− α′)] + (1− µ)}y.
If the agent exerts effort in period 0, his expected utility in period 1 equals E{µ ln[α′R̃+(1−α′)]y+877
(1 − µ) ln y}. If he chooses to shirk, his utility in period 1 equals ln y. Thus, to provide incentive878
for working, the portfolio needs to satisfies the following IC constraint879
β
{




E{ln[α′R̃+ (1− α′)]} ≥ l
βµ
.
To minimize the cost, the IC constraint must be binding, and hence the principal should choose a881
α′ that satisfies E{ln[α′R̃+ (1− α′)]} = lβµ . Since logarithmic function is concave, we have882
E{ln[α′R̃+ (1− α′)]} < ln{E[α′R̃+ (1− α′)]} = ln[α′R̄+ (1− α′)].
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Note that ln[αR̄ + (1 − α)] = lβµ . Then, we have ln[α′R̄ + (1 − α′)] > ln[αR̄ + (1 − α)], which883
implies that α′ > α. The difference between α and α′ depends on the distribution of R̃, which884
becomes smaller when the distribution of R̃ is more concentrated around its mean R̄. Similar to885
the certainty case, given this portfolio, the agent is always indifferent between working and shirking.886
The highest expected utility that he can achieve with initial wealth y0 is the solution to the following887
optimization problem888
Ṽ (y0) = max
c
ln c+ β ln(y)
s.t.889
c+ β{[µ[α′R̄+ (1− α′)] + (1− µ)}y = y0.
Comparing the above problem with the agent’s maximization problem when R̃ is certain, the only890
difference is the “price” of the portfolio, which is higher when R̃ is random because α′ > α. Hence,891
we have Ṽ (y0) < V̄ (y0).892
To summarize, given the same initial wealth y0, the agent can achieve higher expected utility893
when the firm’s value in case of success is certain than when the firm’s value is random. In other894
words, when the firm’s value is random, the principal needs to compensate the agent more to deliver895
the same level of promised utility. The efficiency loss is caused by letting the agent bear risks that896
are not affected by his action. The proof shows that the efficiency loss depends on the difference897
between α′ and α, which further depends on the distribution of R̃. When the distribution of R̃ is898
more concentrated around its mean, the efficiency loss of equity-based compensation compared to899
the optimal contract is less.900
Appendix B: Extensions901
A multi-agent model902
So far, we have assumed that the principal faces a single agent, while in practice a research903
project is usually performed by multiple agents in research teams. In this subsection, using the904
“team-performance case” studied in Shan (2017), we extend the benchmark model to a multi-agent905
model. In this multi-agent model, the research project is performed by a research team that consists906
I > 2 research agents, and the principal can only observe the progress of the project. The objective907
of the principal is to design an incentive-compatible contract for each agent so that every agent is908
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willing to exert effort, i.e., exerting effort is a Nash equilibrium strategy played by all the agents909
at any point in time. For simplicity, we assume that all these agents in the research team have the910
same utility function U(c)− L(a), which satisfies the same assumptions in Section 3. Let λ be the911
arrival rate of success if all agents exert effort and λ−i be the arrival rate if all agent except agent912
i exert effort. Consider the contracting problem for agent i. Conditional on all other agents exert913
effort, agent i increases the arrival rate of success of the team from λ−i to λ if he chooses to exert914
effort. Hence, his benefit for exerting effort is (λ − λ−i)(v̄ − v), and his costs of exerting effort is915
rl. Then, the Nash-incentive-compatibility condition is given by916
(λ− λ−i)(v̄ − v) ≥ rl.
Let Ci,n(v) be the principal’s minimum cost of delivering continuation utility v to agent i when the917
project is at stage n. The cost function satisfies the following HJB equation918
rCi,n(v) = min
u,v̄







= rv − r(u− l)− λ(v̄ − v),
(λ− λ−i)(v̄ − v) ≥ rl.
The properties of the optimal contract are summarized in the following proposition.920
Proposition B.1 The principal’s expected cost at any point is given by an increasing and convex921
function Ci,n(v) that satisfies922
rCi,n(v) = rS(u
∗(v)) + C ′i,n(v)[rv − ru∗(v)− λ−i(v̄ − v)] + λ[Ci,n+1(v̄)− Ci,n(v)],














The cost function when the team completes the last stage innovation is given by Ci,N+1(v) = S(v).924
The instantaneous payment u∗(v) satisfies S′(u∗(v)) = C ′i,n(v). When the team completes an925
innovation, agent i’s continuation utility increases to v̄, which satisfies v̄ = v + rlλ−λ−i . In case of926
failure, the continuation utility v decreases over time and stays at λ−ilλ−λ−i when it reaches the lower927
bound λ−ilλ−λ−i . The instantaneous payment u has the same dynamics as the continuation utility v.928
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The only main difference between this case and the single-agent case is the positive lower bound929
on the implementable continuation utility λ−ilλ−λ−i . To provide an incentive, the principal should930
reward agent i by raising his continuation utility by rlλ−λ−i after success. Thus, even if agent i931
shirks, he still can receive the reward by free-riding on his coworkers’ work and guarantee a positive932
expected utility of λ−ilλ−λ−i .
13933
Since including multiple agents only affects the lower bound on the implementable continuation
utility and the minimum reward in the incentive-compatibility condition, for the implementation
results, the only two modifications are the payoff in case of success and the minimum holding

































All other results go through.934
For general utility functions, the principal needs an individually-designed security for each agent,935
which seems unrealistic. Like the single-agent problem, if the agents’ utility function from consump-936
tion is logarithmic, we can obtain a closed-form solution and provide a practical implementation937
using the equity of the firm. The agents’ compensation packages differ only in the holding require-938
ment (the required fraction of equity) depending on how an agent’s action affects the performance939
of the team. The results of the optimal contract and the implementation for the logarithmic case940
are summarized in the following proposition.941
Proposition B.2 In the multi-agent model, if the agents’ utility from consumption is U(c) = ln c:942
• The minimum cost of delivering continuation utility v to agent i when the project is at stage943
n is given by Ci,n(v) = qi,nev, where the constant qi,n is determined recursively by944









and satisfies qi,n > qi,n+1. When the project progresses to the next stage, agent i’s continu-945
ation utility increases from v to v̄ = v + rlλ−λ−i . In case of failure, the continuation utility v946
evolves according to dvdt = −r ln qi,n −
λ−irl
λ−λ−i < 0.947
13The derivation of the lower bound on the implementable continuation utility can be found in Shan (2017).
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• Suppose the value of the firm increases by Rn times when the project progresses from stage n948
to stage n+1. If Rn ≥ r ln qi,nλ +
λ−irl
λ(λ−λ−i) +1 for all n, then the risky security that implements949
the optimal contract can be created by a portfolio of the firm’s equity and a risk-free asset950
with interest rate r. The fraction of equity βi,n depends on the stage level and satisfies951
βi,n =





Proof of Proposition B.2: Similar to the proof of Proposition 5.1, we first use a guess-and-952
verify method to show that the solution to the stage n HJB equation Ci,n(v) takes the form of953
qi,ne
v given Ci,n+1(v) = qi,n+1ev.954











= rv − r(u− l)− λ(v̄ − v),
(λ− λ−i)(v̄ − v) ≥ rl.
Utility-flow u satisfies the first-order condition S′(u) = C ′i,n(v). Therefore,957
eu = qi,ne
v,
which implies u = v + ln qi,n. The binding incentive compatibility constraint implies that v̄ =958
v + rlλ−λ−i , which implies that
dv
dt = rv − ru−
λ−irl
λ−λ−i = −r ln qi,n −
λ−irl
λ−λ−i . Taking the solution for959
u and v̄ into the right-hand side of the HJB equation, it becomes960
RHS = rqi,ne
v + qi,ne




v+ rlλ−λ−i − qi,nev)






which also takes the form of a constant times ev. Finally, letting the left-hand side of the HJB961
equation equal the right-hand side, we have962
rqi,ne

















Hence, we have verified that if Ci,n+1(v) = qi,n+1ev, then Cn+1(v) also takes the form of a constant964
qi,n times ev, where qi,n is determined by the equation above. Finally, since qi,N+1 = 1, by back-965
ward induction, the cost function at any stage n equals Ci,n(v) = qi,nev, where qi,n is determined966
recursively by967









Next, we show that the constants satisfy qi,n > qi,n+1 by backward induction. Since qi,N+1 = 1,968
qi,N satisfies969































Since the left-hand side is an increasing function of qi,N , it implies that qi,N > 1 = qi,N+1.971
For any n, we have972



















Then, qi,n > qi,n+1 implies that qi,n−1 > qi,n. We have shown that qi,N > qi,N+1. By backward974
induction, we can proof that qi,n > qi,n+1 for all n.975
When the agents have the logarithmic utility function, we have976
Ci,n(v) = qi,ne
v and Vi,n(y) = C−1i,n (y) = ln y − ln qi,n.























which is a linear function of y. Hence, the value of risky security rises by r ln qi,nλ +
λ−irl
λ(λ−λ−i) + 1979
times when the project progresses from stage n to stage n+1. We could replicate the payoff of the980
security using a portfolio of the firm’s equity and a risk-free asset with interest rate r, in which the981
fraction of equity in the portfolio βi,n satisfies982















Finally, Rn ≥ r ln qi,nλ +
λ−irl
λ(λ−λ−i) + 1 guarantees that the security can always be created by the984
firm’s equity.985
Q.E.D.986
As the single-agent case, the risky security can be created by a portfolio of the equity of a987
firm and a risk-free asset, where the fraction of equity, βi,n, only depends on the stage level and988
exogenous parameters of the model. To implement the optimal contract, the principal requires that989
agent i invests βi,n fraction of his wealth in firm’s equity when the project is at stage n.990
Hidden saving991
In the main body of the paper, we assume that the agent cannot engage in hidden saving.992
In the benchmark model, the contract determines a consumption path contingent on the agent’s993
performance. At any point in time, the agent consumes all the payments from the principal and994
cannot save or borrow. In Section 4 and Section 5, although the agent chooses how much to995
consume, he can only invest in the state-contingent security for saving purpose. An important996
feature of the optimal contract in Section 3 is that the principal punishes the agent by cutting997
his consumption in case of unsatisfactory performance. A well-known result, first documented by998
Rogerson (1985), shows that the optimal contract is impracticable if the agent can save secretly due999
to a precautionary saving incentive.14 Aware of the risk of lower compensation in case of failure,1000
a risk-averse agent would save some of his income for consumption smoothing purpose. In some1001
cases, the agent may adopt a double-deviation strategy by shirking to avoid the costs of working1002
and saving secretly to smooth consumption, which makes the problem even more complicated for1003
the principal.1004
To see how hidden saving affects the optimal contract derived in the main body of the paper, we1005
first examine the case when the agent can save secretly at the same rate of return r as the principal.1006
For illustration, consider the following one-period deviation in the discrete-time approximation.1007
Suppose from time t to t +∆t, instead of working and consuming all the payments received from1008
14This problem only arises when the agent can save secretly. If the principal can monitor the agent’s saving, then
the principal can offer a contract contingent on the agent’s saving.
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the principal, the agent shirks and saves some of the payments at time t and consumes the saving1009





[ru′(ct+∆t)∆t](1 + r∆t) = r∆t[u
′(ct+∆t)− u′(ct)] > 0.
The inequality is due to the result that the principal cuts the agent’s compensation in case of1012
failure so that ct+∆t < ct and the assumption that the agent is risk averse. This result suggests1013
that if the agent shirks then he could receive higher utility through hidden saving. Under the1014
consumption allocation of the optimal contract, the agent is indifferent to working or shirking1015
because the incentive-compatibility condition is always binding. It further implies that if the agent1016
shirks and shifts some consumption from the current period to the next period, his deviation payoff1017
is higher than the payoff on the equilibrium path. Therefore, if the agent can save secretly at the1018
same rate as the principal, the principal cannot punish the agent by cutting his compensation for1019
unsatisfactory performance. Otherwise, the agent will adopt a double-deviation strategy, and the1020
optimal contract becomes invalid. This result is similar to the observation in He (2012).1021
However, if the agent incurs a cost on account of hiding his saving, then the low return on hidden1022
saving will mitigate the agent’s precautionary saving incentive. If the return is considerable low, it1023
may restore the optimality of the contract derived in the previous sections. Note that the agent’s1024
saving incentive depends on his marginal utility of consumption. To simplify the notation, we use1025
mt, where mt = U ′(ct), to denote the agent’s marginal utility of consumption at any time t given1026
the contract. Suppose the agent can save secretly at rate r′. The following proposition provides1027
sufficient condition under which the agent has no incentive to save.1028
Proposition B.3 Given contract {ct(Ht), 0 < t < +∞}, if in case of failure the agent’s marginal1029
utility of consumption satisfies1030
d lnmt
dt
≤ −(r′ − r),
then the agent has no incentive to conduct hidden saving. At any point in time, he consumes all1031
the payments from the principal and exerts efforts until the project is completed.1032
Proof of Proposition B.3: We show that under the condition in Proposition B.3 the agent1033
will not engage in hidden saving by checking the agent’s precautionary saving incentive at any1034
time t. Since the contract punishes the agent by cutting his consumption in case of unsatisfactory1035
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performance, the lowest consumption path from time t to t′ that the agent may receive is the one1036
when he fails to complete any innovation during this period time. Since the agent’s utility function1037
is concave, he has the strongest incentive to save when he receives this “worst” consumption path.1038
Thus, if we can show that the agent has no incentive to save even on this “worst” consumption path,1039
then it implies that the agent has no incentive to save on any other consumption paths. The marginal1040
cost of saving at time t equals mt. Since the rate of return on hidden saving is r′, the marginal1041
benefit of saving at time t and consuming it at t′(t′ > t) is e−r(t′−t)er′(t′−t)mt′ = e(r
′−r)(t′−t)mt′ .1042
If in case of failure the agent’s marginal utility of consumption satisfies1043
d lnmt
dt
≤ −(r′ − r),
then on this “worst” consumption path1044
lnmt′ − lnmt ≤ −(r′ − r)(t′ − t).
It implies that1045
lnmt ≥ lnmt′ + (r′ − r)(t′ − t).
Taking exponential to both sides, it becomes1046
mt ≥ e(r
′−r)(t′−t)mt′ .
Thus, the marginal cost of saving exceeds the marginal benefit, which implies that the agent has no1047
incentive to save on the “worst” consumption path. It further implies that the agent has no incentive1048
to saving on any other consumption paths. Therefore, if d lnmtdt ≤ −(r′ − r) in case of failure, the1049
hidden saving problem can be ignored. If the agent will not deviate from the consumption path1050
offered by the principal, the incentive compatibility condition then guarantees that the agent will1051
always exert effort. Q.E.D.1052
Proposition B.3 indicates that if the return on hidden saving is very low so that r′ ≤ r− d lnmtdt1053
for all {ct(Ht), 0 < t < +∞}, then the optimal contract in Section 3 is still optimal as the agent1054
will not deviate from the consumption path suggested by the principal and always put effort at1055
work. In a general setting, this sufficient condition is difficult to ascertain because it has to be held1056













If the agent utility function has CARA form, then U
′′(ct)
U ′(ct)
is a constant number. It can be shown1058
that dctdt is bounded.15 Therefore, for CARA utility function, there exists an upper bound of r′ such1059
that the sufficient condition in Proposition B.3 is satisfied.1060
For logarithmic utility, we are able to derive a closed-form upper bound of r′ that satisfies the1061
sufficient condition in Proposition B.3.1062
Proposition B.4 If the agent has logarithmic utility, the agent has no incentive to conduct hidden1063
saving if save the rate on hidden saving is not higher than r(1 − ln p1) for the single-agent case1064
(r′ ≤ r(1 − ln qi,1) − λ−irlλ−λ−i for all i for the multi-agent case), and hence he will not deviate from1065
the consumption path offered by the principal.1066
Proof of Proposition B.4: For logarithmic utility function, the marginal utility from1067
consumption satisfies1068







Hence, d lnmdt = −
du











= −r ln pn.
Thus, the no-saving condition becomes −r ln pn ≥ r′ − r, which implies r′ ≤ r(1 − ln pn). Since1072
p1 > pn for any 1 < n ≤ N , r′ ≤ r(1 − ln p1) guarantees that r′ ≤ r(1 − ln pn) for all n. Hence,1073
the agent has no incentive to conduct hidden saving if the rate on hidden saving is not higher than1074
r(1− ln p1), and hence he will not deviate from the consumption path offered by the principal.1075










Hence, the no-saving condition becomes that r′ ≤ r(1 − ln qi,n) − λ−irlλ−λ−i . Similarly, r
′ ≤ r(1 −1077
ln qi,1)− λ−irlλ−λ−i guarantees that r
′ ≤ r(1− ln qi,n)− λ−irlλ−λ−i for all n. Hence, agent i has no incentive1078
15Note that ct = S(ut) and ut is determined by S′(ut) = C′(vt). Hence, ct is a continuous function of the
continuation utility vt. Proposition 3.1 shows that dvtdt = r(vt − ut). Therefore,
dvt
dt
is also a continuous function
of vt. The highest level of continuation utility that the agent can achieve is v0 + Nrlλ when the agent completes all
N innovations instantly. Therefore, dvt
dt
is bounded. This implies that dct
dt
is bounded because ct is a continuous
function of vt.
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to conduct hidden saving if the rate on hidden saving is not higher than r(1 − ln qi,1) − λ−irlλ−λ−i .1079
Q.E.D.1080
This result is easier to observe from the aspect of implementation. For the single-agent case,1081
the value of the security raises r ln pnλ + 1 times when the project progresses from stage n to stage1082
n+ 1, and its return in case of failure equals r(1− ln pn). Then, it is obvious that if the return on1083
hidden saving is not higher than the lowest return on the security in case of failure, r(1 − ln p1),1084
then the agent will not have any incentive to engage in hidden saving and deviate from the optimal1085
consumption path. A similar analysis applies to the multi-agent case. The interpretation of this1086
result is that when the firm adopts equity-based compensation and the return on equity-based1087
compensation is higher than the return on hidden saving, then the employees prefer to hold the1088
equities for saving instead of saving secretly. Thus, the firms can almost mimic the optimal contract1089
even if they cannot monitor their employees’ hidden saving levels.1090
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